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John Stewart proposes we study what we
can call “deep social cognition” (DSC),
as opposed to the mere embedding or
extending or modifying of cognition by
social factors, as Stewart characterizes the
tradition of “social cognition” studies to
date.
DSC claims that for humans our basic
or non-empirical categories—space, time,
identity, equality, and so on—are relative
to social practices. One could say that
DSC takes up the mind-in-life continu-
ity thesis (Thompson, 2007) and explores
it relative to human cognition. To fight
the representation lists, early enactivists
insisted that whatever the content of
cognitive processes enacted in the co-
constitution of organismic value and envi-
ronmental affordance, those contents were
in fact enacted and not objective reflec-
tions (realism) or subjective creations
(idealism).
A common enactivist strategy here
was to study single-celled organisms (e.g.,
E. Coli). If they displayed cognition qua
sense-making, then the ground floor of
the mind-in-life continuity thesis would
be established and it would then be a mat-
ter of studying qualitative shifts in the
continuum of organismically rooted cog-
nition: consciousness vs. sentience, self-
consciousness vs. “mere” consciousness,
etc. Once the baseline is established, how-
ever, Stewart implies, there has to be a
follow up investigation of the correlation
in human beings of historical/social forms
of life and basic categories.
After this mise-en-scène, in the remain-
der of the comment I will raise some
points not so much in criticism as in hopes
of offering further research avenues.
(1) Might gene expression regulation in
populations of bacteria allow us to
think the evolutionary depth origins
of DSC? For an introduction to the
issue of bacterial quorum sensing, see
Joint et al. (2007). For an ambitious
attempt at articulating the “origins of
sociable life,” see Hyrd (2009).
(2) DSC falls in the tradition of naturaliz-
ing Kant. A figure of note here is F. A.
Lange, author of an influentialHistory
of Materialism (1974) [1866]. Lange
adds an evolutionary and socializing
perspective to the naturalizing of Kant
begun by Helmholtz in an individ-
ualist and representationalist frame
(Hatfield, 2012). For Lange, however,
the conditions of possibility of experi-
ence are species-specific adaptations.
Lange in turn influenced Nietzsche’s
position that affective-cognitive pat-
terns are relative to “forms of life”
(Stack, 1991; Cox, 1999). Finally,
there is Welshon (2014), which claims
Nietzsche as precursor to “dynamic
embodied-embedded cognitive sci-
ence.” It would thus be very interesting
for the enactivist community to fol-
low up on possible DSC—Nietzsche
connections.
(3) Stewart’s use of Durkheim’s top-down
model could be complemented by
the bottom-up methodology of his
great rival, Gabriel Tarde. Latour
(2002) can serve as an introduction
to Tarde; see De Jaegher (2013) for
a recent enactivist piece thematizing
top-down / bottom up complemen-
tarity in social life. Tarde criticizes
Durkheim for giving himself his
“social facts” as already established:
in this case, the categories of time,
space, subject, object, etc as reflect-
ing social forms. Tarde insists, how-
ever, on an account of the genesis
of such categories from a molecular
field of differences. Tarde is not really
an individualist, however, as the basic
social units are not really units at all,
but “monads” in a constant state of
variation and imitation of others. For
Tarde, then, the big universals—social
forms, basic categories—are formed
and held together by minute “repe-
titions with a difference” (to adopt
the terms of Gilles Deleuze). So Tarde
insists students of society need a
bottom-up methodology—though of
course once the categories are in
place they guide the socialization of
thought in succeeding generations, so
there is room for top-down effects
as well.
Tarde insists however that the social
facts are fragile and in need of
constant reinforcing—just how much
innovation is allowed before top-
down enforcement squelches them,
or indeed, before they take hold and
change the top-level structures? So
adding a bottom-up Tardean perspec-
tive allows us to account for differ-
ent rhythms of change in categories
in a way that Durkheim’s progres-
sive model doesn’t (as I understand it,
Durkheim has an account of moder-
nity as increasing specialization in
the division of labor). Hence Tarde’s
critique of Durkheim:
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Mr. Durkheim spares us such
terrible tableaux. With him, no
wars, no massacres, no brutal
invasions. Reading him, it seems
that the river of progress has
flowed smoothly over a mossy
bed undisturbed by froth or
somersaults. [. . .] Evidently, he
inclines towards a Neptunian,
rather than a Vulcanian, view of
history: everywhere he sees sed-
imentary formations, nowhere
igneous upheavals. He leaves no
place for the accidental, the irra-
tional, this grimacing face at the
heart of things, not even for the
accident of genius. Latour et al.
(2008).
(4) On the general point of a his-
torical/social genesis of basic cate-
gories, the recent “ontological turn”
in anthropology springs to mind. The
main references here are Viveiros de
Castro (2009) and Descola (2005).
A complex movement, bound up
with strong debates on cultural rel-
ativism inside and outside anthro-
pology, I mention it here simply
for the sake of connecting Stewart’s
DSC project with other social sci-
ence movements. A brief extract from
Viveiros de Castro et al. (2014) will
show its relevance: “the anthropo-
logical concept of ontology [entails]
the multiplicity of forms of existence
enacted in concrete practices, where
politics becomes the non-skeptical
elicitation of this manifold of poten-
tials for how things could be . . . .”
(5) Finally, Sohn-Rethel is a complex and
difficult thinker with whom I am not
really familiar. Consequently, I will
restrict myself here to a reference
to Read (2014), with the remark
that Read also looks to the Italian
Autonomia thinkers, in particu-
lar Virno’s reading of Marx on the
“general intellect” as it relates to
the post-industrial economy. This
field of thought bears on Stewart’s
discussion of financial capitalism,
which cannot be underestimated
as a vitally important philosoph-
ical/political topic, just as nuclear
power and global climate change rose
to the forefront of thought in the eras
in which they assumed dangerous
potentials.
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